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The existence and diversity of human cultures are made
possible by our species-specific cognitive capacities.
But how? Do cultures emerge and diverge as a result of
the deployment, over generations and in different popu-
lations, of general abilities to learn, imitate and com-
municate? What role if any do domain-specific evolved
cognitive abilities play in the emergence and evolution
of cultures? These questions have been approached
from different vantage points in different disciplines.
Here we present a view that is currently developing out
of the converging work of developmental psychologists,
evolutionary psychologists and cognitive anthropologists.
A cultural group is held together by a constant flow of
information, most of which is about local transient
circumstances and not transmitted much beyond them.
Some information, being of more general relevance, is
repeatedly transmitted in an explicit or implicit manner
and can end up being shared by many or even most
members of the group. ‘Culture’ refers to this widely dis-
tributed information, its representation in people’s minds,
and its expressions in their behaviors and interactions.
Anthropologists have been justly fascinated by the
richness and variety of human cultures, which they have
documented and tried to explain. To do so, they have relied
on a view of the mind, if not literally as a ‘blank slate’ [1], at
least as an unbounded and unbiased learning machine,
equally open to any kind of cultural content. This
‘standard social science model’ [2] of the relation between
mind and culture has been more and more forcefully
challenged both from inside and outside anthropology. It is
in particular incompatible with much recent work in
developmental psychology according to which the child’s
acquisition of knowledge is guided by domain specific
cognitive dispositions [3]. The challenge that current
research attempts to address is that of reconciling the
evident diversity of culture with our best hypotheses about
cognitive development, and in so doing to help lay down
new foundations for anthropological theory.
Not just the diversity but also the stability of culture
begs explanation. Cultural representations and practices
must remain stable enough across the community through
which they propagate for people to recognize themselves as
performing, for instance, the same ritual, endorsing the
same belief, or eating the same food. To maintain their
stability while reaching a cultural level of distribution,
cultural information has to be remembered and trans-
mitted again and again with very little alteration, or else
the accumulation of such alterations would compromise
the very existence of culture. Anthropologists [4], and now
also ‘memeticists’ [5,6], have assumed that human capaci-
ties for memory, imitation and communication are reliable
enough to secure faithful reproduction of the contents they
process across group and generations.
Yet, as has been known since Bartlett, content trans-
mitted through a chain of individuals undergoes rapid
distortion and decay [7]. Recent approaches to memory
and to communication emphasize that both involve recon-
struction rather than copying of the material remembered
or communicated [8,9]. As for imitation, although remark-
ably developed among humans, it is not very reliable
either, and is limited to the reproduction of perceptible
behaviors [10]. One cannot for instance perceive, and
hence imitate, mental states such as linguistic competence
or cultural beliefs. In spite of the limitations of imitation,
communication and memory, there is (and has been since
well before the invention of writing) an abundance of
stable cultural contents. What mental mechanisms con-
tribute to making this stability possible? Two different
but mutually compatible and possibly complementary
approaches should be mentioned here. Boyd, Richerson
and their collaborators have modelled the stabilizing role
of psychological biases in transmission favoring for
instance prestige or conformity [11–13]. Atran, Boyer,
Hirschfeld, Sperber, and their collaborators have stressed
the stabilizing role of the child’s disposition to acquire
knowledge structured in domain-specific ways [14–19].
Here, we report work related to this second approach.
Modules and their domains
In the case of non-human animals, the view that a
cognitive system is an articulation of evolved domain- or
task-specific autonomous devices or ‘modules’ is fairly
uncontroversial [20]. Many of these modules, for instance
the imprinting mechanism of geese or the food aversion
mechanism in rats, involve some degree of learning. In the
case of humans too, there is a growing body of evidence
suggesting that, to an important extent, the cognitive
system is comprised of modular devices, dedicated to
specific tasks – for instance, to face recognition [21,22],
language acquisition [23], or attribution of mental states
[24]. Most of these devices (especially those organizingCorresponding author: Dan Sperber (dan@sperber.com).
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higher-level conceptual content) can be seen as ‘learning
instincts’ fostering and guiding the acquisition of knowl-
edge and skills in specific domains [25] (see Table 1).
Still, the view that the human mind might, like that of
other animals, be to a large extent an articulation of
modules is quite controversial. The terms of the debate
were set by Jerry Fodor, who, in his 1983 The Modularity of
Mind, proposed a definition of modules that is more
appropriate for input modules, arguing that higher
cognitive functions are not modular [26,27]. Our approach
to mental modules is less rigid than Fodor’s, and more in
line with recent views of modularity found in comparative
psychology, evolutionary psychology, evolutionary biology
and artificial intelligence [28–30,20,2]. Here we don’t
review the arguments for the modularist view of the
human mind [29,31]; we assume it and explore its
implications for the cognition–culture interface.
An evolved cognitive module – for instance a snake
detector, a face-recognition device, a language acquisition
device – is an adaptation to a range of phenomena that
presented problems or opportunities in the ancestral
environment of the species [32]. Its function is to process
a given type of stimuli or inputs – for instance snakes,
human faces, or linguistic utterances. These inputs
constitute the proper domain of the module [19]. To
recognize items belonging to its proper domain, a module
uses formal conditions that an input has to meet to be
accepted and processed. All inputs meeting the input
conditions of a module constitute its actual domain. These
inputs conditions can never be perfectly adequate. Some
items belonging to the proper domain of the module might
fail to satisfy them – a snake can look like a piece of wood.
Some items not belonging to the proper domain of a module
might nevertheless satisfy its input conditions – a piece of
wood can look like a snake. If only because cognition is a
probabilistic activity, the actual and the proper domain of a
module are unlikely ever to be strictly co-extensive. There
will be false negatives – that is, items belonging to the
proper domain but not to the actual domain; and false
positives – items belonging to the actual but not to the
proper domain (Figure 1a).
Mismatches between domains
The mismatch between the proper and the actual domain
of a module can result in part from the exploitation of the
module by other organisms, as in cases of camouflage
(creating false negatives) and mimicry (creating false
positives). Many insectivorous birds for instance have the
ability to detect wasps, which are dangerous to eat. Hover
flies, which are good food for these birds, have evolved
black and yellow stripes on their abdomen that mimic the
appearance of wasps and activates the birds’ wasp
detecting module. These hover flies have invaded, to
their own benefit, the actual domain of the birds’ wasp
detector (Figure 1b).
In general, systematic mismatch between the proper
and actual domains of a module is likely to occur when the
module is manipulated by other individuals, whether of
the same or of different species. This takes place to a
unique extent among humans. Humans seek to influence
one another in many ways, and hence need to both attract
and direct the attention of others. A reliable way to attract
attention is to produce information that falls within the
actual domain of modules, whether or not it also falls
within their proper domain. Moreover, given the rigid
patterns of modular processing, the direction in which
such information is likely to be processed is relatively easy
to predict.
A great variety of cultural artifacts are aimed at specific
modules. For instance, face recognition modules found in
primates accepts as input simple visual patterns that in a
natural environment are almost exclusively produced by
actual faces. In the human cultural environment, a great
many artifacts are aimed at the face recognition module.
Table 1. Domains for which strong developmental, comparative and neurocognitive data exist
Theory of mind Capacity to interpret behavior in terms of mental states like belief and desire [57–61]
Folkbiology Capacity to sort living things in terms of their morphology and reason about them
in terms of biological principles like growth, inheritance, digestion, respiration, etc.
[34,37,38,53,62,63]
Number Capacity to distinguish collections of objects according to the (small) number of
elements in the collection
[64–66]
Face recognition Capacity to distinguish conspecific faces from other similar stimuli and to identify
individuals by the specificity of their faces
[21,22,67,68]
Naive mechanics Capacity to form consistent predictions about the integrity and movements of inert
objects
[69–71]
Folk sociology Capacity to sort conspecifics into inductively rich categories, membership in which
is based on (supposedly) shared intrinsic natures
[42,55,72]
Figure 1. (a) The proper domain (blue) and the actual domain (red) of a cognitive
module. In assigning items to a domain, it is likely that there will be some false
negatives and some false positives. (b) The proper domain (blue) and the actual
domain (red) of a wasp-detector module. An area of the actual domain (shown in
black and yellow stripes) is occupied by hover flies mimicking wasps (false posi-
tives).
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They include portraits, caricatures, masks and made-up
faces. The effectiveness of these cultural artifacts is in part
explained by the fact that they rely on and exploit a
natural disposition. Often, they exaggerate crucial
features, as in caricature or in make up, and constitute
what ethologists call ‘superstimuli’. The effectiveness of
these artifacts in turn helps explain their cultural
recurrence. More generally, the actual domain of human
mental modules is invaded and inflated by culturally
produced information. When some specific type of infor-
mation is culturally produced to activate a module, it can
be described as a cultural domain of the module. For
instance portraits, caricatures, masks and made-up faces
are cultural domains within the actual domain of the face-
recognition module (Figure 2). Cultural domains are likely
to be outside of the proper domain of the module, as is the
case with portraits, caricatures or masks. They might also
fall within the proper domain as in the case of made-up
faces: these are genuine faces and therefore it is the
function of the face recognition module to analyze them;
however they are faces that have been artificially trans-
formed so as to interpreted for instance as younger or
healthier than they really are.
The case of folk biology
All animals interact with a variety of other animals and
plants and must organize knowledge about them to guide
their own activities and interpret the properties and
behaviors of other species (e.g. aggression from predators
or sweet taste from ripe fruits). In the human case,
categorization of living kinds is complex, comprehensive
and cultural [33,34]. In different cultural traditions plants
and animals play diverse roles (e.g. in activities ranging
from foraging and agriculture to totemism). Nevertheless,
folk taxonomies the world over are remarkable in the
degree to which they structurally resemble each other and
in the extent to which they match scientific taxonomies.
Sorting plants and animals into categories is largely
guided by regularities in perceptual discontinuities in
morphology in local ecologies [33,34]. However, reasoning
about living things is not principally based on general
inductive processes. Developmental findings provide
evidence for a special-purpose module for folk or naive
biology. Despite often fragmentary and limited experience,
young children’s inferences and expectations about the
nature of living things are like adults’: they are based on
the fact that category membership supports very rich and
varied inferences [35]. These inferences obey a naı¨ve form
of reasoning according to which each living kind has an
unseen essence. These species-specific essences are
thought to have causal effects on the appearance and
behavior of members of the kind [36]. Young children, for
example, privilege common folk category identity over
similarity in appearance when inferring whether different
living things share biologically-relevant properties. Young
children also understand that a living thing’s category
membership is fixed, both with respect to developmental
changes that organisms naturally undergo and with
respect to the imperviousness of species-typical properties
(even in the hypothetical case of an individual raised by
members of another species; see Box 1). Cross-cultural
Figure 2. The face-recognition module, with its proper domain (i.e. genuine faces) shown by the blue ellipse, and its actual domain (i.e. face-like stimuli) shown by the red
ellipse. In green are four cultural domains of the module: made-up faces (which are in the proper domain as they are genuine faces), portraits, caricatures and masks.
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evidence is scant, but what little exists indicates that both
expectations do not vary culturally [37,38].
The unique importance of animals and plants in
ancestral environments and the fact that they afford
domain-specific patterns of classification and inference
suggest that a dedicated module might have evolved that
governed the categorization of living kinds and reasoning
about them. The similarities of folk taxonomies across
cultures and the regularities in the acquisition and
deployment of these taxonomies confirm this hypothesis
[14]. The proper domain of the living-kinds module would
have been the local plants and animals with which the
individual had to interact. However, the fact that inputs to
this module come not just from direct experience of the
living creatures to be categorized but also, and crucially,
from communication with other people allows expanding
the actual domain of the module well beyond its proper
domain and the limits of local ecology. Using verbal
descriptions and pictures as inputs, the module might
build representations of many species with whom the
individual is unlikely ever to interact – including extinct
species such as the dinosaurs, or imaginary species such as
dragons.
The module can enrich its categories with information
about both familiar and unfamiliar species, information
the relevance of which is often cultural rather than
practical. Indeed, folk biology strikingly illustrates how
the existence of evolved modular dispositions to attend to
and organize information in a domain-specific way lends
itself to a massive cultural exploitation. For example, in
modern societies, wolves are encountered, if at all, only in
zoos. However a culturally transmitted representation of
wolves as dangerous predators of humans (which they
are not) is among children’s earliest acquisitions. This
representation is a strong attention catcher, a source of
recurrent metaphors, and it plays an important role in
folklore and children’s literature [39]. Culturally reinter-
preted wolves have become superstimuli. Modular pro-
cessing of information about living kinds is similarly the
basis for the variety of cultural exploitations lumped
together in classical anthropological theory under the
label of ‘totemism’ [40].
Box 1. Studying folk nativism with ‘switched-at-birth’ tasks
Adults in all cultures recognize that living things display a constancy in
identity over time, even when they undergo dramatic changes in
appearance and behavior (as when caterpillars become butterflies or
cuddly tiger cubs turn into fierce adult tigers). Lay people the world over
appear to explain this constancy in terms of unseen essences [47,33].
Each species is thought to have a unique essence that controls the
development of species-typical attributes. Each organism’s species’
essence is thought to be fixed at birth and to remain impervious to
variations in the environment in which the organism is reared (an apple
seed grows into an apple tree even if planted in a pear orchard).
There are several proposals concerning the origins of these beliefs.
Carey and her colleagues contend that genuine biological under-
standing emerges only through learning and conceptual change that
accompany ever growing experience with living things in a cultural
environment and that essentialist reasoning is a function of language,
not a property of folk biology [48]. Atran and Gelman, among others,
instead argue that nativist bias and commitment to unseen essences are
expressions of a special-purpose cognitive mechanism that evolved to
interpret a specific range of input (e.g. patterns of movement indicating
animacy and underlying mental states [49] as well as patterns of
morphology indicating discrete types [47]).
Findings from variants of a single experimental task, in which
subjects are asked what happens when a newborn is raised by non-
biological parents, have frequently figured in this controversy (much as
performances on false-belief tasks have figured centrally in discussions
of Theory of Mind). In these tasks, subjects are read vignettes about
newborns who are switched at birth from the care of biological to non-
biological parents. Subjects are asked to choose among alternative
outcomes with respect to the species the newborn will become and the
sorts of behaviors and physical features it will develop. Gelman and
Wellman, the first to use the task [50], showed 4-year-olds drawings of a
newborn animal (e.g. a cow) and a group animals of another species
(e.g. pigs) and explained that the newborn was raised by parents of the
other species [50]. They then asked children whether the cow would
develop species-typical features (a curly versus straight tail) and
whether it would develop species-typical behaviors (mooing verus
oinking). They found that children overwhelmingly judged that the
animal would develop the species-typical attributes and behaviors of its
birth parents. Other researchers have obtained similar results
[37,38,51–53]. This pattern of reasoning, however, is consistent with
contemporary Euro-American lay and scientific biology; hence, these
results might reflect cultural learning rather than a universal cognitive
predisposition. In an effort to resolve the question, attention has turned
to nonWestern children’s performance on the switched-at-birth task.
Atran, Medin and their colleagues tested children in several unrelated
cultures and found that different cultural traditions and different
experience with the natural environment did not affect performance
on a switched-at-birth task using non-human animals [37,38,53],
suggesting that it does reflect a universal predisposition.
Switched-at-birth tasks have been used also to investigate essenti-
alist thinking in naı¨ve sociology. Researchers have found that young
American children appeal to unseen essences when reasoning about
human reproduction, expecting that little girls grow up to be women
even if raised in male-only environments [54] and that black children
grow up to be black adults even if raised by a white family [18]. Slightly
older South Asian children similarly expect that Brahmin children grow
up to be Brahmin adults even if raised by Untouchables (R. Mahalingam,
PhD thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1999).
Some cultures, however, seem to reject social nativism. Astuti [55]
has done ethnographic and experimental work among the Vezo of
Madagascar, a culture that publicly endorses the belief that an
individual’s ethnicity is determined not by birth but by his or her life
experiences. In spite of this public rejection of social nativism, Vezo
adults presented with a switched-at-birth task reasoned as social
nativists. What about Vezo children? If social nativism is learned from
the public culture rather than from adults’ private inferences, then, given
that Vezo culture rejects social nativism, so should Vezo children. A
switched-at-birth task with children revealed an interestingly mixed
pattern. When the alternatives were Vezo birth parents and adoptive
parents from a closely related neighboring group, Vezo children
reasoned in accord with cultural tradition and rejected social nativism.
In contrast, when the adoptive parents were from a more distant and
more disimilar group, Vezo children, like adults, endorsed social
nativism.
These switched-at-birth experiments show that people’s inference
patterns do not necessarily follow the cultural discourse even though
they may be influenced by it. Together with other experiments on
inference patterns across culture [56] they demonstrate that, to
understand people’s ways of thinking in different cultures, ethno-
graphic observation should be complemented with experimental work,
and in particular experiments with children.
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The case of folk sociology
All social animals face the challenge of coordinating
behavior with members of their own and other social
groups. Among primates, the increasingly complex forms
of group living have played an important role in the
evolution of higher-order cognitive capacities such as
deception and its detection, coalition formation, and social
intelligence generally [41]. Primates (human and non-
human) simultaneously belong to many social groupings
(based on territory, intragroup status, sex, biological
relatedness, and transient or opportunistic coalitions),
membership in any of which provides a basis for predicting
and interpreting the behavior of others [42]. The cognitive
demands of such reasoning is sufficiently specific and
complex to suggest the possibility of a special-purpose
modular competence in naive or folk sociology.
Unlike the social lives of non-human primates, human
social life is thoroughly cultural. All forms of social
organization, from biological-sounding ‘kinship’ to such
artificial groupings as monastic orders and political
parties, vary culturally and rely on culturally transmitted,
partly explicit institutional rules. The distinction we
propose between the proper and actual domains of a
cognitive module makes it possible to understand this
cultural diversity as a function of the evolution of abilities
found in other primates. The proper domain of primate and
ancestral social intelligence modules consisted in the
group affiliation of conspecifics. The actual domain of
these modules was determined by whatever (in an
individual’s bodily appearance, behavior, or the reaction
of others to them) provided evidence of their group
memberships (e.g. chimpanzee strategies of facial pheno-
typic matching used in kin recognition) [43].
The culturalization of social groupings must initially
have consisted in the elaboration of these cues of group
membership. For instance, to natural sexual dimorphism
was added a cultural gender dimorphism. Thus existing
mechanisms for social cognition were presented with
culturally contrived superstimuli (just as in the case of
face recognition superstimulated with make-up, or the
activation of notions of kin-solidarity to strengthen non-
kin-based coalitions). Cognitively, groups are character-
ized by whatever cues makes it possible to identify their
members and by the inferences this identification affords.
In an ancestral environment these cues were natural,
although there need not have been anything in the
ancestral module that precluded the possibility of cultur-
ally enhanced or constructed cues.
Indeed, just as living kinds are categorized not only on
the basis of direct experience, but also, and crucially, on the
basis of communication, the recognition of social groups
draws heavily on verbal labels and stereotypes and other
expressions of attitude. The displacement of natural signs
of group membership by more salient cultural signs
together with communication about the consequences of
group membership made possible the construction of novel
social groupings [44]. If a culture recognizes, say, castes as
genuine social categories with distinctive consequences for
their members, then they are genuine social categories
(although their actual sociological character may be
misrepresented in the folk sociology). Whatever culturally
constructed social groupings, at a given time and place,
happen to fill the actual domain of a social competence
module also falls within its proper domain.
The case of supernaturalism
Folk biology and folk sociology are cultural systems of
representations that, we argued, might each be grounded
in a specific evolved cognitive mechanism. However, not
every system of cultural representations matches a
distinct cognitive disposition. It is implausible for instance
that representations of supernatural beings and events of
the type found in all religions (and also in folklore, art and
literature) are grounded in an ad hoc cognitive mechan-
ism. After all, supernatural beings, unlike living kinds or
social groups, were not part of the environment in which
humans evolved. It has, nevertheless, often been argued
that religion responds to a basic human need, be it a need
for answers to fundamental questions, a need for trans-
cendance, a need comfort and reassurance, or a need for
superior authority. From a point of view informed both by
cognitive science and evolutionary biology, the existence of
such needs and the ability of religion to satisfy them
are quite questionable. Typically religious beliefs raise
more questions than they answer, and cause anxiety as
much as they comfort (there is, say, a promise of eternal life
after death, but it might be spent in Hell). Explaining
religion by a religious disposition lacks insight and
plausibility [45].
The ubiquity and salience of cultural representations of
supernatural beings might be accounted for in terms of a
modular cognitive architecture without assuming that
there is a modular disposition to represent such beings or
to look for supernatural explanations. Representations of
supernatural beings do not just depart from what is taken
to be natural or ordinary. A zebra with red and blue stripes
or a person who, like Borges’s character Funes, remembers
everything, however out of the ordinary and in practice
impossible, are unlikely ever to become culturally recog-
nized supernatural beings. Supernatural beings are not
just impossible in nature. They blatantly violate the kind
of basic expectations that are delivered by domain-specific
cognitive mechanisms. In direct clash with naive physics,
some are able to be in several places at the same time or to
pass through solid objects. In direct clash with naive
biology, some belong to several species at the same time or
can change from one species into another. In direct clash
with naı¨ve psychology, some can literally see all past and
future events. Despite these striking departures from
intuitive knowledge the appearance and behavior of
supernatural beings is otherwise what intuition would
expect of natural beings. That is, they have enough of the
characteristic features of plants, animals, people, topo-
graphic entities or celestial bodies to fall squarely in
the actual domain of cognitive modules. Supernatural
animals have, apart from their supernatural features, a
regular biology. Supernatural agents have a belief-desire
psychology. As argued by Boyer, it is this combination of
a few striking violation with otherwise conformity to
ordinary expectations that makes supernatural beings
attention arresting and memorable, and rich in inferential
potential [46].
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Representations of supernatural beings, we suggest,
spread and stabilize in different cultures because they
function for one or several cognitive modules as super-
stimuli. Unlike other superstimuli, which have some
features exaggerated and essential features maintained,
these cultural superstimuli typically combine not just
exaggerated but also paradoxical features with ordinary
and essential ones. One way in which they can be
paradoxical is in falling simultaneously in the actual
domain of two different modules. For instance, a sacred
tree might have agency attributed to it: its appearance
activates a naive botany module, whereas what is said of it
and the way it is treated activates a ToM module.
Representations belonging to a complex system such as a
religion (which involves not only representations but also
practices, artifacts and institutions) need not be all
anchored in one and the same cognitive module. On the
contrary, multiple anchoring in several cognitive mechan-
isms may contribute to the cultural system’s stability [15].
Conclusion
The propagation, stabilization and evolution of cultural
representations clearly have a variety of causes. They are
helped or hindered by demographic and other ecological
conditions, in particular by man-made features of the
environment, and by religious, educational and political
institutions. We agree with standard social science that
culture is not human psychology writ large and that it
would make little sense to seek a psychological reduc-
tionist explanation of culture. We believe, however, that
psychological factors play an essential role in culture.
Some of these psychological factors have to do with
emotion more than with cognition. Here, we have reviewed
some recent work suggesting that cognitive factors, in
interaction with these other factors (ecological, sociologi-
cal, emotional) can help explain cultural diversity and
stability. In particular, a modular organization of human
cognitive abilities favors the recurrence, cross-cultural
variability, and cultural stability of a wide range of cul-
tural representations. Future research in this perspective
should explore other cultural domains – for instance
numeracy, morality, kinship structures, folk epistemology,
rhetoric, aesthetics – where the cognitive and the cultural
sciences might prove ever more mutually relevant.
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